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Abstract— National Root CAs enable legally binding E–
Business and E–Government transactions. This is a report
about the development, the evaluation and the certification
of the new certification services system for the German
National Root CA. We illustrate why a new certification
services system was necessary, and which requirements
to the new system existed. Then we derive the tasks to
be done from the mentioned requirements. After that
we introduce the initial situation at the beginning of
the project. We report about the very process and talk
about some unfamiliar situations, special approaches and
remarkable experiences. Finally we present the ready IT
system and its impact to E–Business and E–Government.
Index Terms— CC–Evaluation, E–Commerce, E–
Government, Global PKI, National Root CA, Trust
Center
I. INTRODUCTION
The directive 1999/93/EC [1] of the European Union
obligates each member to operate a National Root CA
(NRC). Each one spans a national public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI). This enables legally binding digital signatures
within each country. Such signatures are considered
equivalent to regular hand-written signatures in most
cases. They are called “qualified electronic signatures”.
This provides reliable and trustworthy E–Business and
E–Government transactions. By having each NRC mu-
tually “cross–recognizing” all others, this infrastructure
is lifted to an international context.
According to §3 of the German digital signature
act (SigG) [2] the German Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications and Posts1 (RegTP) is responsible
for operating the NRC of Germany. The RegTP launched
a tender procedure to obtain a new IT system for its
certification services in the first quarter of 2003. This
1http://www.regtp.de/en/index.html
was necessary because the old system could not easily be
adapted to changes in the requirements. We now describe
these requirements.
The reliability of digital signatures is based on cryp-
tographic algorithms as public key signature schemes
and cryptographic hash functions. As the research in
cryptanalysis goes on the security status of the available
cryptographic primitives degrades over the time. As an
example Wang et al. have shown in [3] how to produce
collisions for SHA1 better than with brute force. Lenstra
et al. have shown in [4] how to produce colliding X.509
certificates. To reflect the developments the German
Federal IT Security Agency2(BSI) regularly suggests
suitable cryptographic algorithms and associated param-
eters. The IT system must be easily adaptable to these
guidelines.
In parallel, the ISIS–MTT [5] SigG–Profile [6] was
advanced to version 1.1. It addresses technical require-
ments of the SigG and the respective ordinance (SigV)
[7]. It is based on the X.509 [8] and the corresponding
PKIX [9] specifications. Conformance to these standards
was another demand.
In the old system, certificate revocation information
was handled in a proprietary way based on black and
white lists. They came along with a special viewer
software and were not integrated into any common
application. A demand of the tender procedure was to
move to online certificate status checking based on the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [10] and the
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [11].
Apart from these new requirements, the system had
to comply to the SigG and the SigV. This included the
certification of the overall security concept as well as
the evaluation of parts of the system according to Com-
2http://www.bsi.de/english/index.htm
mon Criteria (CC) [12] or the Information Technology
Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [13], respectively.
Furthermore, it must be possible to migrate the data
assembled in the old system to the new one.
The FlexSecure GmbH,3 a spin-off from the
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt,4 was as a subcontrac-
tor of T–Systems5 responsible for the software compo-
nents of the NRC. This paper reports on this project from
the developer’s point of view.
II. OUR TASKS
We had to participate in the development of the overall
system design as well as the preparation of the respective
security concept. The most challenging task was to
integrate our software (FlexiTRUST) into the rest of
the system in a way that suffices the requirements of
SigG, SigV and ISIS–MTT and preserves as much of the
flexibility of our software as possible. Therefore, we had
to go into the very details of the respective documents
to be able to consider their impact on our design.
We had to prepare the software for a successful
accreditation. We therefore evaluated it to the required
security level of the Common Criteria. This is described
in Section IV and had several aspects. The software had
to be adapted to higher security requirements. Evaluation
of a system causes a lot of additional documentation
to be written and most of it is not suitable for any
other purposes than evaluation. Lastly, it meant diligent
testing of the whole system. This was even more an
issue, since we would not be able to change any lines
of code afterwards without voiding the evaluation result.
The testing had to be performed and documented in a
formalized way.
We had to implement an OCSP responder that con-
forms to the respective requirements, most notably the
ISIS–MTT SigG–Profile. This component had to be built
from scratch and integrated into the existing system. This
was even more an issue, since the component has to be
highly available while producing OCSP responses with
qualified electronic signatures (SigG) using evaluated
signature creation devices (smart cards).
Formalizing the implemented security mechanisms
was another requirement. According to the CC–
methodology we had to mathematically prove that all
cryptographic parameters (like passwords) are resistant
against attacks with the formal potential ”high”. The
logging had to be extended. The CC dictates which
events have to be logged in the various functional
3http://www.flexsecure.de/ojava/home_en.html
4http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/index.en.html
5www.t-systems.com
components. We had to identify those in our software and
implement and prove their audit proof logging. Also the
delivery procedures and the installation procedures of the
software had to be specified, described and documented
in a formal way.
Lastly, the evaluated system had to be put into op-
eration at the RegTP’s site. This included setting up
the software, performing integration tests, migrating the
old data to the new system and training the RegTP’s
personnel.
III. INITIAL SITUATION
When we started the project we already had a Trust
Center (TC) software called FlexiTRUST. It is a compo-
nent based system which supports all necessary tasks.
These are registration, certification, certificate revoca-
tion, key generation and publication of the respective
products. FlexiTRUST has been developed as a part
of our academic work. Thus it had some experimental
characteristics. The main design goals had so far been
the flexibility to seamlessly exchange cryptographic al-
gorithms and parameters, to easily integrate into existing
workflows and to scale to ongoing load demands.
FlexiTRUST was already successfully employed in
a variety of projects both in academic and business
environments. Each project had different characteristics
and requirements, but none of them were comparable
to the project described here. This project had a lot
of entirely new aspects which were not covered by the
original design.
FlexiTRUST did not pass a certification process as de-
manded for an accredited certification services provider
(CSP) before. It also had not been evaluated according
to the CC, yet. It was evident, that most of the security
functions of FlexiTRUST would have to be enhanced to
achieve the high demands.
FlexiTRUST already complied to the X.509 and PKIX
standards families. It supported all necessary and com-
monly used extensions of certificates and certificate revo-
cation lists. It already provided mechanisms to integrate
further extensions as demanded. Thus, being conformant
to the ISIS-MTT SigG profile seemed to be straightfor-
ward.
The project schedule was extremely tight. The sys-
tem had to be designed, adapted, tested, documented,
evaluated, installed and certified within 6 months. As
all parties (the developers, the evaluators, the certifiers
and the customer) announced a high level of motivation
and willingness for cooperation we were confident to
succeed.
IV. PROCESS
The most difficult task was to make FlexiTRUST
fulfill the security requirements of the SigG and SigV
within the given time. This became even more complex
as we decided to evaluate the whole software instead
of only the obligatory parts. This was done to be able
to benefit from the evaluation in other projects. The
approach was to take the security concept demanded
by the SigG as the basis for deriving a security target
(ST) for the evaluation process according to the CC. The
FlexiTRUST system then was adapted accordingly and
the necessary documentation was produced. The certifi-
cation of the security concept of FlexiTRUST amounts
to certifying the evaluation results. It soon became clear,
that this approach would not succeed, if we took these
steps sequentially as it is common practice.
The idea was to solve these tasks in parallel and in
close cooperation with all parties. While the security
target was developed together with the evaluating and
the certifying authority, we already began to adapt our
system to those requirements which seemed to be stable
in the ST. Parallel to changing the software we started
developing the high and low level design documents.
Whenever we finished a document, we immediately
consulted the evaluator. Thereby we obtained three major
advantages. Firstly, the evaluating authority very early
gained an outline as well as detailed information about
the structure of our system. Secondly, we could take
their responses into account for the development of the
other documents. Thirdly, by linking the requirements
of the security target very early to our implementation,
we got a better understanding of them. The last two
points were especially valuable, since we have not had
any experience in evaluation processes.
The parallel work in close cooperation with the other
parties was also valuable in the documentation process.
It saved us from reading and understanding the entire
CC framework and allowed us to concentrate on what
was really important for our project. The first developer
who wrote a certain kind of document had to learn this
from the standards. The guidance from the other parties,
as well as taking the common evaluation methodology
(CEM) [14] into account, helped to avoid mistakes,
misinterpretations and dead ends. This developer was
then able to support the next team member with the
same task. By this, knowledge spread quickly in the
whole team. This speeded up the evaluation process
considerably.
A crucial point was to decide, which security require-
ments to achieve solely by FlexiTRUST and which to
delegate to the environment. A trade-of needed to be
found between the time necessary for adaptations and
the flexibility gained or lost by delegating them to the
environment. As shown later in this section it was not
always possible to implement the best solution due to
the tight schedule. But particularly because of the close
collaboration with the evaluating and certifying parties,
we came to a working solution that can be considered
optimal within the given context.
Being conformant to the ISIS–MTT specification
turned out to be more complex than we thought at
first. The upcoming version 1.1 was not yet stable.
Furthermore, we had no client applications available
to test against except for the test bed implemented by
Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH.6
According to the requirements of the Common Criteria
we had to defend our system also against attacks from
inside the trust center that are carried out with the attack
potential “high”. This had by far the most striking impact
on the adaptation process. It could not by any means
be achieved or supported by the environment like e.g.
the operating system. While the registration front-end
already employed strong authentication and role based
access control, this was not true for starting and stopping
the trust center components as well as the protection of
the secrets used within the processes (like e.g. database
passwords). To counter the high attack potential we
implemented strong authentication based on smart cards
for all accesses to the software. To defend against attacks
from inside we employed a multi party control scheme.
In order to satisfy the CC requirement of establishing
“trusted channels” we had to assure that even the end–
points of the internal communication are authentic. This
caused among other things, that we wrapped the entire
communication between the publishing component and
the LDAP servers in an SSL protocol and protected the
required keys with the dual control scheme mentioned
above.
The development process did not resemble what we
had faced so far. Usually we had been working at our
office or at home — most of the time being connected
to the internet. According to CC the sources of the new
FlexiTRUST version had to be highly protected against
unauthorized access. Now, we had to work in a dedicated
access controlled area and on dedicated machines. The
source code repository was off–line and each change to
it was monitored and had to be signed by the developer
and the officer responsible for the respective module.
We planned to use an evaluated and accredited highly
secure signature generation component from a third–
party vendor. This component would include the card
6http://www.secorvo.de/
reader as well as the driver software. This would have
allowed us to seamlessly exchange this component e.g.
to adapt to different cryptographic algorithms. It turned
out, that the driver software would not be available in
an evaluated version in time. Thus we had to evaluate
the driver as a component of our system. Apart from the
extra work to have it evaluated, we also lost the ability to
change this component without the reevaluation of our
system.
V. RESULT
Figure 1 shows the main components of FlexiTRUST.
The Registration Authority (RA) is responsible for col-
lecting and verifying the end entities data. The Certificate
Management Authority (CMA) provides the services
dealing with the TC products. The Key Authority (KA) is
sheltered by the RA and the CMA. Among other duties
it signs the TC products with the issuer private keys. See
[15] for more information on the KA.
Fig. 1
FLEXITRUST ARCHITECTURE
FlexiTRUST employs a generic provider architecture
for dealing with cryptographic algorithms that abstracts
from implementation specific details. This allows to
seamlessly exchange the algorithms by installing a dif-
ferent cryptographic provider. If cryptographic hardware
is involved the exchange of algorithms clearly is limited
to those algorithms which are supported by the currently
available cryptographic hardware. As we use the stan-
dard PCKS#11 [16] interface, such hardware can also
be replaced. By default we deliver our own provider
called FlexiPROVIDER7 which provides a variety of
established and novel algorithms.
7http://www.flexiprovider.de/
FlexiTRUST is multi client capable and therefore
supports virtual hosting. This means that it is possible to
host different, independent trust centers in parallel and at
one site. The German NRC is therefore able to offer this
as a service to the NRCs of other countries. Moreover,
this allows to take over the duties of those certification
service providers which ceased operation. It is the duty
of NRCs to carry on the directory services of its deceased
accredited certification service providers.
FlexiTRUST is built of components. Each component
again consists of modules for the respective tasks that
it has to perform. This allows integrating it into differ-
ent environments by applying, configuring or omitting
certain modules. It is further possible to distribute the
installation over a network, either on the component level
or even on the module level. This enables to scale the
installation with respect to its load. If the load of the
overall system is small, everything can be installed at one
spot (e.g. on one laptop). As load increases the modules
that are concerned can be replicated and/or offloaded
to different machines in order to distribute the load.
This was e.g. done for the OCSP responder. To be able
to apply a qualified signature to the OCSP responses,
the responder utilizes certified cryptographic hardware.
In our case these are standard smart card readers with
evaluated cards. A reader, a card and the required control
logic (software) are implemented as one signer module.
To scale the number of responses that can be signed in
a certain amount of time, the number of active signer
modules is simply increased.
There are two possibilities to run the system in a fault
tolerant mode. One is to generate redundancy on module
level as it is done for high load situations. If one module
fails the others can take over its work. The second is to
replicate components or even the entire trust center at a
different spot. Depending on the components and on se-
curity considerations, they can be operated as hot or cold
standby systems. In this project we decided to replicate
the entire trust center. All modules that are concerned
with the revocation of certificates (including OCSP and
LDAP) are operated as hot standby systems, whereas all
other modules run as cold standby systems. The two trust
center instances are operated at two different cities. The
hot standby systems are synchronized over a dedicated
and protected line, the others via portable media (which
increases the security).
The modularized approach also enables to adjust the
security level. High security modules can be replaced
by less secure ones. For example the OCSP’s smart card
signer module can be replaced by an implementation that
uses keys held in software. There is a variety of rea-
sonable combinations to reach different security levels.
Clearly exchanging components or modules forces a re–
evaluation of the new configuration (if desired).
The generated products and offered services are fully
standards compliant. The Certificates and Certificate Re-
vocation Lists are following the PKIX standard respec-
tive the ISIS–MTT SigG profile. The offered services
use standard protocols as LDAP or OCSP.
VI. IMPACT
The introduced certification service system enables
legally binding and globally trustworthy transactions in
E–Commerce and E–Government.
FlexiTRUST is installed as a NRC. It can be installed
as NRC for other countries, too. Further it is possible
to host foreign NRC within existing installations. Thus,
FlexiTRUST enables legally binding digital signatures in
an international context. This is a basic requirement for
global trustworthy E–Transactions.
FlexiTRUST is able to be used with arbitrary cryp-
tographic algorithms and parameters. Thus it can be
adjusted to the ongoing cryptographic efforts. In addition
this makes the TC suitable to be used with the Fail–
Safe–Concepts proposed by Maseberg [17]. Due to these
two points it is possible to ensure long term security.
Thus long term non–repudiation for E–Transactions is
possible.
Having a set of NRCs alone is not enough. The
customers / citizens and the companies / civil services
have to be equipped with keys and certificates. This
efforts that a small meshed infrastructure of PKIs has
to be established. Those PKIs have to conform to the
respective laws to provide an environment suitable for
legally binding signatures. For small companies it might
sufficient to deal with a few dozens of certificates. But
the TCs of big corporate groups may have to deal
with thousands of certificates and might have to answer
millions of status requests. And the services have to be
guaranteed. FlexiTRUST can easily be installed at com-
panies, civil services and other institutions as it can easily
be integrated in the existing workflows. It is certified to
fulfill the legal demands. In addition it is possible to
install it in the whole range between low load and high
load cases. The robustness of the system is ensured by
failover mechanisms. As we see, FlexiTRUST enables
the area–wide participation of institutions and people in
E–Business and E–Government.
Having all people and institutions participating in
PKIs still is not enough. It must be ensured that each
entity is able to communicate with any other entity.
FlexiTRUST produces standard compliant products and
offers standard compliant services. This guarantees a
high interoperability and ensures that using the infras-
tructure is easy and efforts only minimal training of the
participants. Thereby it is possible to have comfortable
E–Transactions between any entities.
By having legally binding long lasting signatures,
an area–wide participation, a high interoperability and
a comfortable usage, the trust in the infrastructure as
well as its acceptance is raised. This addresses the most
important issue on E–Business and E–Government. The
people must be willing to execute E–Transactions.
VII. CONCLUSION
By winning the respective tender procedure we had the
task to deliver the TC for the new German NRC which
is hosted by the RegTP. This was a remarkable duty as
we had to fulfill many special demands laid on us by the
BSI, the ISIS–MTT standards, the SigG respectively the
SigV and particularly by the obligatory CC–Evaluation
procedure. For this we had to execute different tasks. We
had to prepare the system for a successful accreditation.
This included a successful evaluation. Finally we had to
install the system on the target platforms and to configure
the environment properly.
The most crucial point in the project was the extremely
tight schedule. We had 6 month for fulfilling all the
above mentioned tasks. To solve this we worked in close
cooperation with the evaluating party, the certifying party
and the customer. By this we were able to parallelize
tasks which usually are executed as serial steps. Another
remarkable point was that we had to conform to the
upcoming and not yet stable version 1.1 of ISIS–MTT.
The methodology as well as the requirements of the
CC in form and content had direct implications to the
code and all other aspects of the project, such as the
design, testing, configuration management and delivery
of the software. Especially the security mechanisms we
had to implement had to be conformant with the formal
requirements of the CC.
Finally we succeeded in our task. In November 2003
FlexiTRUST 3.0 Release 0347 was evaluated according
to CC EAL3 augmented. The strength of the established
security mechanisms is “high”. The CC certification
report is confidential and thus can not be referenced here.
In December 2003 the software was attested to conform
to SigG and SigV. The respective certificate can be found
in [18].
FlexiTRUST fulfills all legal demands, ensures long
term security, is scalable in capacity, robust and produces
standards conforming products. Thus it enables legally
binding and trustworthy transactions in E–Business and
E–Government.
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